The Origins of Constitutional Gender Equality in the Nineteenth-Century Work of Elizabeth Cady Stanton by Thomas, Tracy
1 
THE ORIGINS OF CONSTITUTIONAL GENDER EQUALITY 
IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY WORK OF  
ELIZABETH CADY STANTON 
Tracy A. Thomas* 
The fall colloquium of the Center for Constitutional Law at Akron 
highlighted the significant constitutional work of pioneering feminist 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton for equality in the political, domestic, and 
religious spheres.  It also celebrated the conclusion of my ten-year 
intellectual odyssey of Stanton’s instrumental work for the development 
of feminism and family law.  This colloquium brought together what in 
my view is some of the best current thinking on Stanton’s intellectual 
legacy.  The New York Times Book Review often asks writers which 
famous authors they would most like to invite to dinner, thus reflecting 
the writer’s admiration for those authors’ work.  Well these are my ideal 
guests.  Writing outside of the box, immersed in careful research, and 
advancing the discourse on women’s history, these women epitomize the 
excellence and depth of work emanating from the feminist scholarship 
tradition. 
My role at the colloquium was to introduce Elizabeth Cady Stanton.  
For Stanton is not as well-known as she should be.  She does now appear 
briefly in history text books, identified as the founder of the women’s 
suffrage movement at Seneca Falls, New York, in July 1848.  The 
Women’s Rights National Historical Park at Seneca Falls 
commemorates this event.1  Stanton’s political partnership with Susan B. 
Anthony is somewhat familiar.2  Stanton, though, was so much more. 
She was the leading feminist thinker and figurehead of the “woman’s 
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1. National Park Service, Women’s Rights Nat’l Historical Park, http://www.nps.gov/
wori/index.htm.  
2. Ken Burns, Not for Ourselves Alone: The Story of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B.
Anthony, video (PBS 1999).  
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rights” movement of the nineteenth century.3  Beginning with her 
written Declaration of Sentiments at Seneca Falls, she demanded 
wholescale reversal of women’s subordinate position in society and the 
concomitant restraints on their autonomy.4  She demanded the vote for 
women, equality in employment and education, equality in the family 
and parenting, reform of religious institutions, and the full eradication of 
“separate spheres” and the notion of women’s moral, physical, and 
intellectual inferiority.5 
Married to abolitionist reformer Henry Stanton, who ignored her 
important work in pursuit of his own ambition, and burdened with the 
care of seven children, Stanton moved in and out of political circles until 
her children were grown.6  When able to be in action, she petitioned the 
New York Legislature for legal reform, including no-fault divorce, 
domestic violence protection, women’s ownership of marital property, 
and maternal custody of children.7  She led the National Woman’s 
Suffrage Association with Anthony, advocating a federal strategy for 
voting rights and a constitutional amendment.  And she challenged the 
church with its foundational premises of women’s moral weakness and 
sinful nature, rewriting key Biblical passages from a feminist perspective 
and challenging the clergy’s omnipotent sexism.8 
The essays in this colloquium explore each of these key sites 
Stanton identified as locations of women’s oppression: church, state, and 
home.  Felice Batlan begins in Domestic Disorders: Suffrage and New 
York’s Constitutional Convention of 1867 by detailing Stanton’s work 
for women’s suffrage at the state convention, revealing the charged 
political context in which questions of African American suffrage and 
fears of women’s loss of domesticity foreclosed her demands.  Lisa 
Tetrault elaborates on Stanton’s demand for women’s political equality, 
revealing new insights about her views of political economy and the 
3. See TRACY A. THOMAS, THE FEMINIST FOUNDATIONS OF FAMILY LAW (forthcoming 
2016); ELIZABETH CADY STANTON: FEMINIST AS THINKER (Ellen Carol DuBois & Richard Candida 
Smith eds. 2007); Tracy A. Thomas, The “Radical Conscience” of Nineteenth-Century Feminism 
(chapter 1 of Feminist Foundations book), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2675631.  
4. Declaration of Sentiments, Report of the Woman’s Rights Convention, Held at Seneca
Falls, N.Y., July 19th and 20th, 1848. 
5. Id. 
6. Thomas, Radical Conscience, supra note 3, at 4-6. 
7. Thomas, FEMINIST FOUNDATIONS, supra note 3; Tracy A. Thomas, Elizabeth Cady
Stanton and the Federal Marriage Amendment: A Letter to the President, 22 CONSTL. COMM. 137 
(2005). 
8. ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, THE WOMAN’S BIBLE (1895); see Thomas, FEMINIST 
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 3, chap. 6. 
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ways in which class inequality converged with women’s rights.  Lisa 
Hogan in Sexual Exploitation in the Rhetoric of Elizabeth Cady Stanton 
then picks up the trail about the fear of women’s loss of domesticity in 
the home, discussing Stanton’s critique of the sexualization of women in 
marriage and society.  Completing the overview of Stanton’s intellectual 
work, Kathi Kern taps into Stanton’s ideas about religious liberty, and 
juxtaposes those against similar arguments of liberty made today in 
opposition to women’s rights. 
My own contribution to an intellectual history of Stanton’s work 
focuses on her ideas and advocacy for equality in the family.  In my 
forthcoming book, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and the Feminist 
Foundations of Family Law, I delve into her work in six areas of 
domestic relations: marital property, marriage, domestic violence, 
divorce, reproductive choice, and parenting.9  What I discovered was 
that Stanton advocated virtually every gender equality law reform that 
was later advanced and adopted after the 1970s divorce revolution.  No 
fault divorce, joint marital property, marital partnerships, bodily 
autonomy, domestic violence protections, and maternal custody were all 
proposed by Stanton.  These seem so non-controversial today because 
they have all become the status quo of the law.  But in the nineteenth 
century, these ideas granting women social and sexual equality in the 
private sphere of the family clashed with Victorian ideals and the 
privilege of manhood embedded in legal doctrines of coverture.  She had 
few supporters of these family equality ideas, despite large affiliations 
on the topic of women’s suffrage.  The family was considered off-limits, 
private, and the bastion of protected femininity.  Contradicting this 
conventional wisdom, Stanton exposed the private domestic sphere as 
repressive, not protective, denying women legal rights, autonomy, and 
ultimately, freedom. 
The context of the family was also where Stanton developed her 
insight as to the commonalities of women as a class.10  Using domestic 
relations as the prime example, Stanton illustrated how all women were 
treated the same by the law—denied economic, legal, and personal rights 
regardless of their individual circumstances, class, wealth, or abilities.  
Here, she proved, all women were treated the same because of their sex. 
It was this universality that Stanton used to draw women together in a 
social and legal movement, moving beyond their reluctance and 
9. Thomas, FEMINIST FOUNDATIONS, supra note 3. 
10. Id.; Tracy A. Thomas, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and the Notions of a Legal Class of
Gender, in FEMINIST LEGAL HISTORY (Tracey Jean Boisseau & Tracy A. Thomas eds. 2011). 
4 CONLAWNOW [7:1 
dismissals of “I have all the rights I want.”  This notion of class-based 
commonality would become critical to constitutional challenge to sex 
discrimination, as developed by the Supreme Court in twentieth-century 
jurisprudence.11 
The work of writing feminist history continues as scholars in law, 
history, women’s studies, and all fields continue to recover the missing 
pieces of history.  Until that recovery is fully integrated into the 
conventional narratives of a shared history, we have much left to do. 
11. Frontiero v. Richardson 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
